

Anticipated Endgames for the Maturation of Preparedness Support

**Casey A. Barrs, Director
Center for Civilians in Harm’s Way (CCHW)**

| ENDGAME | CHARACTERISTICS | CORE APPROACH | FUTURE ROLE |
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| <p style="text-align: center; color: #e67e22; font-weight: bold; font-size: 1.2em;">Open Source</p> | <p>A paradigm shift in civilian self-protection called <i>Preparedness Support (PS)</i> can become the next Do No Harm movement in the aid community.</p> <p>The prima facie case for saying agencies will adopt and integrate PS holds that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS fulfils the calls of some of the best and brightest in the aid community. • Those calls require that vital scattered lessons be brought into one systematic process made available in one open source venue—as PS will be. • PS serves the core obligations and profound self-interest of aid agencies. • PS practices mesh well with the skill sets of aid agencies. • PS may challenge certain aid practitioner ‘mindsets’ and institutional constraints. These will be addressed. | <p>Launch an incentives campaign that persuades and equips aid agencies to conduct PS with their local counterparts and communities.</p> <p>Incentives regimen (<i>Open Source portion</i>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research baseline (years of documentation already done). • Guidance (tools and services) for crafting PS policy and orientation to PS practice. • Broad outreach as well as one-on-one persuasion and support • Prestigious partner to assist with the above. (A renowned think tank, government bureau, or university that sees PS as a marquee initiative and will support publication and help convene workshops, panels, and peer platforms.) | <p>After the finite costs of tooling up materials and templating services, CCHW remains a clearing house of guidance and advocacy for PS.</p> <p>CCHW continues one-on-one outreach, persuasion and support as ranks of aid agencies grow.</p> <p>The above activities will be enhanced as pilots (noted below) provide more grist for guidance and persuasion.</p> <p><u>Other potential:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Translation of select material into other languages. |
| <p style="text-align: center; color: #e67e22; font-weight: bold; font-size: 1.2em;">Replication</p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em; margin-top: 10px;">NOTE: Aid agencies are the most visible ‘replicators’ of PS. Yet their recruitment and support of <i>local</i> staff, facilitators, trainers, and wardens ensures a ‘lower-canopy’ perpetuation of PS—even after the agency that propagated it is largely sidelined by violence. Case examples reveal spontaneous second and third generation iterations of PS are apt to occur locally.</p> | <p>The prima facie case for saying agencies will adopt and deliver PS holds that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All the “conceptual pieces and moving parts” of preparedness support have been proven before. Yet proof-of-concept from scattered precedents will not be proof enough for some nonprofits who have everything from staff security to agency brand to worry about. <p>Thus CCHW will ensure an agency pilot of the <i>full PS process</i>; this will become the ‘tipping point’ for replication by peers.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The net costs of delivering PS are nil or nominal, depending upon absorption. (Much of PS can be run by ‘generalist’ aid workers.) Yet for some bare-bones nonprofits almost any net cost without commensurate revenue can be a disincentive to adoption. | <p>Advance the incentives campaign cited above with two key thrusts: piloting and marketing.</p> <p>Incentives regimen (<i>Replication portion</i>):</p> <p><u>Piloting</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify potential partners on the ground. (The most willing may be agencies whose local counterparts and communities face the most danger.) With the prestigious partner(s) cited above, persuade agencies to consider testing PS. • From the broadly defined PS model of operation, determine refined pathways suitable to the agency and context. (This may entail internal agency reviews, field surveys, and simulations.) • A Go—No go decision is made (jointly with local counterparts) after the assessment stage. • When pilots are given a “Go,” then the adaptable steps for | <p><u>Stay in front of the field:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluate pilots, get lessons (including risk mitigation) looped back into guidance. Post on CCHW’s website. • Collaborate with field-bound researchers to expand current <i>Inventory</i> of how locals survive violence alone. (On website) • Refine & diversify simulations • Certify those who adopt PS as “<i>Aya agencies</i>” (pp. 22-23, “Incentives Campaign for the Aid Community”) • Advocate for PS to be incorporated into SPHERE humanitarian standards. <p>NOTE: CCHW’s fixed costs will be low. The variable costs of these future tasks may proceed at a static or declining level as:</p> |

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| | <p>Thus CCHW will help create a humanitarian market demand for preparedness support.</p> | <p>implementation noted on the CCHW website are taken.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CCHW recommends both “<i>longitudinal evaluation</i>” (which compares the same populations at different times) and “<i>latitudinal evaluation</i>” (which compares different populations—some doing PS, some not—at the same time.) The latter represent randomized control trials. <p><u>Optional marketing</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Help craft a new public pitch. Tap a vein of humanitarian appeal driven by admiration for ‘heroic villagers’ rather than pity for ‘hapless victims.’ • Help craft a new donor pitch. Private and government donors alike may be swayed by the unparalleled benefits of a PS approach. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guidance products are largely finalized. • Services are largely routinized. • (Optional) As confidence in its model grows, CCHW begins to levy fees and contracts for certain products and services. Any such pricing schedule should be at-cost or less so as not to pose a disincentive. • (Suppositional) Other standard bearers amplify the PS model. Ex.: Many groups emerged to take core precepts and practices of the Do No Harm movement to the aid community. Could such a synergy reduce CCHW’s ultimate marginal costs? <p>Residual mission: No one considers the DNH mission “finished.” As long as there are new crises and new agencies and staff, extended coverage (replication) is needed. The same would be true for PS.</p> |
| <p>Government Adoption</p> | <p>PS is a high-impact, low-cost and discrete option for some of the most difficult foreign policy choices that governments ever face.</p> <p>States and interstate organizations have vast operational as well as donorship roles in aid and protection. Uptake by them will make PS an irreversible global practice.</p> <p>The key targets would be:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The US Government (USAID) • European governments • The United Nations <p>Note that governments and entities with governmental membership tend to be more constrained and cautious than nonprofit agencies and may be apt to follow such NGOs in the adoption of PS.</p> | <p>Win government or UN adoption through two key thrusts:</p> <p><u>Incentives</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An incentives campaign is again vital. Strong PS pitches include its cost-effectiveness and its unique suitability for non-permissive settings. This addresses core concerns about efficiency, accountability, and security. • Some government or UN departmental chiefs feel less constrained and cautious than others; such idiosyncrasies should be exploited for the purpose of adoption. • History shows aid’s greatest innovations occurred as a result of peril. This proclivity might incline CCHW to target government or UN programs facing the greatest danger. <p><u>Pilots and outsourcing</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Success of nonprofits during the proof-of-concept and early scaling phases will give strong impetus to government and UN adoption. • Governmental and UN bodies have longstanding relationships with the nonprofit sector and do much of their work through such entities. | <p>As with the ‘Endgames’ depicted above, CCHW continues in its animation and support roles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continued marquee research on PS in theory and in practice. • Clearing house of guidance and advocacy for PS. • One-on-one persuasion and support for US, European, and UN adoption. • Pilot evaluation, with lessons looped back into guidance. • Certification of government or UN bodies that adopt PS as “<i>Aya agencies</i>.” <p><u>Other potential</u> (not budgeted):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local capacity for nonlethal self-preservation has powerful implications not just for aid and protection but also human rights, nonviolent resistance, disaster risk reduction, early warning and response, peacekeeping, and security sector reform, as well as efforts to manage conflict and reduce recruitment into violence. See CCHW Briefing Series. |

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| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In many cases their ‘adoption’ of PS will actually consist of playing midwife to the effort through those NGO partners. This suits the sensitive contexts in which PS is needed: aid history is replete with examples of governmental and UN bodies outsourcing discrete low-profile work. That is, they often <i>need</i> this outlet. | |
| <p style="text-align: center;">Diaspora Collaboration</p> <p>NOTE: The decision point on <i>whether or not to undertake</i> diaspora collaboration would come after proof-of-concept and early scaling phases when CCHW can best assess the arc of its mission and capacity.</p> | <p>Typically, no one cares more about civilians in harm’s way than the émigré, refugee, and asylee who has left an at-risk community behind. And no one responds earlier to their peril.</p> <p>Typically, no outside entity is better positioned to help brace locals’ capacity to survive alone amid violence than the aid service provider.</p> <p>Typically, no outside entity has deeper pockets for funding such life-critical efforts than the humanitarian donor.</p> <p>If ever there was a life-saving collaboration waiting to happen it is the potential synergy of diasporas, aid providers, and donors all watching as violence starts to unfold.</p> | <p>CCHW’s core approach would be to identify, connect, and support these three sets of actors. Each has comparative strengths and deficits. CCHW would broker collaboration built around tapping PS’s great untapped potential.</p> <p>These three actors have limited experience working together. It may thus be a prerequisite to have evidence of strong pilots (above) before such alliances are tried.</p> <p>Collaboration would be framed in “Three-Party Pacts” (with CCHW as facilitator) that guide:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mapping diaspora, aid agencies and donors engaged in a given crisis. • Vetting the track record of diaspora and aid agencies—and their chosen local counterparts. • Using select diaspora and aid agencies to assess and approve prospects for implementing PS. PS tactics number in the hundreds—including ways to help shock-proof <i>remittances</i>. • Leveraging potential diaspora remittances with donor <i>match funds</i>. • Channeling these funds to crisis zones for PS efforts overseen to the satisfaction of the tripartite members. • Developing an e-roster of select diaspora talent deployable to crisis zones. | <p>There is the potential for the use of “Three-Party Pacts” to become routinized and replicable.</p> <p>Yet from CCHW’s position as a facilitator, diaspora collaboration would entail a sizeable start-up effort beyond the other Endgames described above. For example, staff expertise in transnational populations might need to be hired.</p> <p>Brokering collaboration can be a very labor-intensive activity. So too, the mapping, vetting, roster-making, would require new variable costs with each new crisis.</p> <p>Thus due to open questions of cost and the fact that this effort would likely not be feasible until the start of breakout scaling, collaboration with diasporas is not factored into our current estimate of UP philanthropic capital required.</p> <p>Note however that collaboration with diasporas should be closely held for future consideration. Many who face conflict come to depend on diaspora monies for their survival. These remittances, valued in the billions, are always countercyclical: they increase while investment and development aid decline in the face of violence, and they often come to outstrip those official sources.</p> <p>So too, diasporas are often the first (by months or years) or even only to get life-critical resources to local providers and populations. They are indigenous self-protection at its best. It would be strategically short-sighted not enhance their future role.</p> |